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Abstract
Purpose - This paper fills the gap between defining and measuring the productive limits of a machine or
system, and the impact of various assumptions about the productive potential of the nature and
informativeness of capacity cost management systems. The authors focused on the various ways in
which multi-dimensional limits (for example, time, space, volume and/or value-creating ability) can be
used to define productive capacity. Specifically, our research suggests that the limits used in establishing
the capacity cost management system restrict the amount and nature of the information the system is
capable of providing to management.
Justification – Two reasons are identified for studying the impact of capacity measurements on
organizations. First, firms which make the best use of their resources can be expected to outperform their
competitors. The second arises from the potential structuration effect of capacity metrics. Such an
investigation makes capacity a visible, and hence an actionable, construct.
Design/Methodology – To explore these issues, a combination of analytics and qualitative field research
methodology was used. The measurement dimensions were developed by analyzing the different reports,
baseline measures, and metrics included in the various capacity models as suggested by the literature.
These analytics were enriched with observations obtained from field research.
Findings – Maximizing the value created within an organization starts with understanding the nature and
capability of all the company’s resources. The outcome is the identification of capacity systems
specifically suited for particular types of operations, both manufacturing and service.
Practical implications - Such frameworks would allow organisations in developing economies, to make
visible, the drivers of waste and productivity and to identify the primary assumptions and implications of
various capacity limits.
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Structural Limits of Capacity and Implications for Visibility
Abstract
Purpose - This paper fills the gap between defining and measuring the productive
limits of a machine or system, and the impact of various assumptions about the
productive potential of the nature and informativeness of capacity cost
management systems. The authors focused on the various ways in which multidimensional limits (for example, time, space, volume and/or value-creating
ability) can be used to define productive capacity. Specifically, our research
suggests that the limits used in establishing the capacity cost management system
restrict the amount and nature of the information the system is capable of
providing to management.
Justification – Two reasons are identified for studying the impact of capacity
measurements on organizations. First, firms which make the best use of their
resources can be expected to outperform their competitors. The second arises
from the potential structuration effect of capacity metrics. Such an investigation
makes capacity a visible, and hence an actionable, construct.
Design/Methodology – To explore these issues, a combination of analytics and
qualitative field research methodology was used. The measurement dimensions
were developed by analyzing the different reports, baseline measures, and metrics
included in the various capacity models as suggested by the literature. These
analytics were enriched with observations obtained from field research.
Findings – Maximizing the value created within an organization starts with
understanding the nature and capability of all the company’s resources. The
outcome is the identification of capacity systems specifically suited for particular
types of operations, both manufacturing and service.
Practical implications - Such frameworks would allow organisations in
developing economies, to make visible, the drivers of waste and productivity and
to identify the primary assumptions and implications of various capacity limits.
Key Words - Capacity management, Cost management models, Capacity limits.
Paper type – Research paper.
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Structural Limits of Capacity and Implications for Visibility
1. Introduction
There are two quite different, yet compelling, reasons for studying the
impact of capacity measurements on organizations. In a purely economic sense,
that firms which ceteris paribus make best use of their resources can be expected to
outperform its competitors (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).
Since capacity
measurements help identify the relative degree of productive versus
nonproductive utilization this knowledge should be of great value to practitioners
and academics interested in economic optimization.
A second and perhaps more compelling reason for being interested in
capacity measurement arises from the potential structural effects of capacity
measurement metrics. Capacity metrics create a unique “coding” of the timespace dimensions of an organization’s productive capability. They create an
“analytical and useful space” for calculating, evaluating and comparing
performance across multiple machines, systems, or activities (DeBruine and
Sopariwala, 1994; McNair and Vangermeersch, 1998), making capacity a visible,
and hence actionable, construct (Burchell, et al., 1980).
Capacity can be viewed as a measurement of the value-creating ability of a
machine or system (McNair and Vangermeersch, 1998). But, how much of this
potential resides in any one machine, any one system? It is this issue—the
difficulty in defining and measuring the productive limits of a machine or
system—that remains at the heart of debate about capacity analysis and
management.1 When measuring the limit of capacity Debruine and Sopariwala,
1994, used a practical capacity measure based on the capacity the firm expected to
activate, however in a later paper Sopariwala (1998) recommends using
“maximum available capacity” (p. 34). There is considerable agreement in the
existing management accounting literature that it is important to consider
theoretical or practical capacity when making strategic and operating decisions
(e.g., Cooper and Kaplan 1992; McNair and Vangermeersch 1998). Yet, less
attention has been paid to the impact of various assumptions about this
productive potential on the nature and informativeness of capacity cost
management systems (DeBruine and Sopariwala, 1994; Brierley, et al., 2001).
Without this examination it is unclear what exactly are the implications of various
definitions of an asset’s productive limits (e.g., its base capacity measure), and the
choice of one method over another remains one of opinion and preference rather
than analytically grounded.
This paper seeks to fill this gap, focusing on the various ways in which
multi-dimensional limits (e.g., time, space, volume and/or value-creating ability)
can be used to define and make productive capacity more visible. Specifically, this
1

Many of the early debates and articles on capacity spent considerable time debating how best to define a capacity
baseline. Authors such as Gantt (1915a) questioned the specific definition of “normal” capacity, while the NACA debates
sought to determine whether practical or normal capacity should be used. One of Gantt’s major beliefs was that a firm
should use theoretical capacity if it were to truly capture its productive capability as well as its level of waste.
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research suggests that the limits used in establishing the capacity cost
management system (CCMS) bound the amount and nature of the information the
system is capable of providing to management. This paper builds further on
existing literature (Hertenstein, et al., 2006) adding additional field study context
and data to develop an analytical framework for defining and measuring
productive capacity in both manufacturing and service settings. Using the
informativeness of the resulting systems, as defined by their completeness,
stability and ability to make visible the drivers of waste and productivity
(Hopwood, 1983), the analysis will seek to identify the primary assumptions and
implications of various capacity limits for visibility and managerial action.
Following the review of existing literature, three different models of
capacity measurement and analysis will be explored, beginning with a standard
cost models through an approach that links capacity measurement to the market’s
perception of a firm’s value-creating ability. In each case, the role played by the
assumed limits of a system’s productive capacity on the nature and amount of
information the system provides will be examined. These observations and results
will then be used to develop a series of conclusions that may serve as the basis for
a more complex theory of capacity measurement. Finally, conclusions will be
presented with suggestions for future research into the role of limits in capacity
cost management.
2. Capacity: An Interdisciplinary Perspective
Historically, capacity analysis has been focused on planning and assessing
the utilization of various machines and machine-paced processes within an
organization. Capacity utilization measures serve as a leading indicator at a
macro-economic level, signaling the health of the economy. When capacity
utilization numbers drop, recession becomes a concern. When they reach all-time
highs, inflation worries are raised. Given that these metrics play a key role in
setting macroeconomic policy, one would assume that they must be fairly well
defined and understood. But are they?
Table 1
To begin this discussion of capacity and the concept of limits, it’s useful to
first develop the basic terminology for the various baseline measures of potential
capacity (see Table 1). As can be seen, there are significant differences in the
concept of “productive potential” embedded in these various definitions. A firm
that believes it can only make 9,000 units with one machine may buy a new asset
when it consistently requires more output than this amount, even though it is
producing far below the theoretical limits of the machine. In other words, the
analytical space created by a normal or budgeted capacity definition appears to
mask, or make invisible, this additional productive capability (McNair, et al.,
2003).
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While it may seem counterintuitive, to suggest that managers will manage
from the abstraction or coding of the physical embedded in the capacity measures,
there is unfortunately empirical evidence that such blinding to physical reality
does occur. As shown by McNair, et al., 2003, managers tend to make asset
decisions based not on the theoretical capacity of their assets, but rather on the
relationship between normal and future expected demand (see Table 2).
Specifically, a manager who believes that future demand is going to require
108.7% utilization of their assets behave differently (e.g., may consider purchasing
new assets) than those who perceive their utilization level to be 25.8%. The way in
which capacity was defined and presented within the firm’s reporting system
appeared to alter the surface and deep structures, or conceptualization, of
management’s decision-making (McNair, 1994: Brausch and Taylor, 1997).
Table 2
Empirical research suggests that annual budgeted capacity is the dominant
form of capacity baseline used in European and North American firms (Drury and
Tayles, 1994; Brierley, et al., 2001). As noted by Brierley, et al., (2001: 228):
There has been a lack of research examining the measurement
of the denominator capacity level for overhead rates. From
the evidence available, the majority of firms use a measure of
budgeted capacity and this is likely to have an adverse
impact on the accuracy of product costs.
Putting this discussion into perspective, average asset utilizations were
reported as part of a firm’s financial statements prior to 1932 in the United States.
Theoretical capacity was the accepted baseline measure during this period. In
1932, in the depths of the Great Depression, U.S. Steel reported it was only at 13%
effective utilization of its plant (McNair and Vangermeersch, 1998). It would
appear based on the results of current research that many firms may have excess
assets at near historical levels, and that these excess assets stand to drive up their
cost of production and reduce their competitiveness and profitability in both the
short- and long-term.
One final example may be useful at this point. Approximately six years
ago, Anheuser-Busch, a leading US brewing company, adopted theoretical
capacity denominator activity level as the basis for their capacity cost management
system and capacity planning.2 A primary competitor, Coors Brewing, another US
brewer, continued to use budgeted capacity as its denominator activity level. In
2002, a comparison of the asset acquisition policies and overall asset utilizations
yielded a striking result. Specifically, Anheuser-Busch experienced increase in
both share and total volume, yet noted in their published financial statements that

2

This information was provided by an anonymous source at Anheuser-Busch who had attended a capacity presentation by
Dr. McNair and subsequently notified her that this change had been made.
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it had reduced its asset base significantly. In the same period, Coors lost volume
yet purchased a significant level of new assets.
Anheuser-Busch continues to obtain share through aggressive price cutting,
while increasing its profitability overall. The stock market is rewarding this
performance. Conversely, Coors continues to lose share while profits plummet
due to reduced industry prices. It would appear from this casual evidence that
Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) initial observations are quite applicable to the arena
of capacity measurement. Specifically, Anheuser-Busch’s superior performance in
the beer industry appears to be at least tangentially related to the fact that it
appears to know more accurately the relative productive performance of its
productive resources. This leads to the first research proposition for this study:
Proposition:
The way in which capacity is measured and reported seems
to affect management decision-making as well as the
economic performance of the firm.
3. Literature Review
It could be argued that there is a potentially infinite variety of capacity
reporting models available to managers in organizations. Yet, March and Shapira
(1982) suggest that there may be a relative degree of uniformity in such systems
when they note that organizations characteristically do not solve problems; they copy
solutions from others (1982: 98). In other words, it would argue that ceteris paribus, a
firm is likely to choose among the most publicly available forms of CCMS rather
than investing in creating a new system. This being said, three advanced forms of
CCMS were identified for use in this study from an examination of the extant
literature in capacity (DeBruine and Sopariwala, 1994; Klammer, 1996; McNair and
Vangermeersh, 1998):
• CAM-I model
• Logistics model
• Value creation model
Based on the criteria suggested by Feltham (1972) and March and Shapira
(1982), these three systems were then compared in terms of their informativeness.
Informativeness was defined as the number of dimensions of potential capability
they emphasize (e.g., the number of limits established by the system) and the
degree to which these dimensions are tightly bounded or defined with respect to
their productive potential. Specifically, they were examined in terms of their
relative bias (what is made visible), the stability of the resulting cost
estimate/signal (the quality of its linkage between past and future results, or
uncertainty), and their completeness (the number and type of variances, or
underlying variability, they can generate). Table 3 details the way that each of
these dimensions was defined and measured.
Table 3
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In the 1990s CAM-I (Consortium for Advanced Manufacturing,
International), a leading think tank for new management accounting models,
embarked on the development of a more robust and informative capacity
reporting model that would utilize the power of relational database designs and
sophisticated data collection capabilities of modern manufacturing equipment
(Klammer, 1996). When describing the CAM-I capacity model, Klammer defined
its objective in the following way, “Communicating idle capacity information is
one priority of the capacity model” (Klammer 1996, 28).
Debruine and Sopariwala, 1994 argue that using annual budget capacity
companies hide excess capacity and are therefore unable to act on it. By
employing theoretical or practical capacity measures excess capacity costs can be
reported separately and fixed costs become visible (Ostrenga, 1988). Klammer’s
CAM-I model not only highlights idle capacity, it provides information on the
types and reasons for this idle capacity. This information in turn helps
management understand the extent to which these non-value-added costs reduce
corporate profit and focuses management attention on the need to more fully
utilize capacity.
The CAM-I model accounted for all the time available within a capacity
system, separating this analysis on two dimensions (1) manned versus unmanned
time; and (2) the effectiveness of the utilization of manned time (productive versus
non-productive). The costs of the system were also broken into two separate
categories: committed and managed. Unmanned hours would be charged
committed costs only (e.g., unavoidable fixed asset expenses), while manned time
would be charged its share of managed (e.g., resources used to make the machine
capable of producing, such as people and power) and committed costs.
Each category of time (idle, productive, and non-productive) is then further
broken down by primary cause into a system of variances, including machine
breakdowns, planned maintenance, material problems, staffing problems,
developmental time, and so forth. Informed by the continuous improvement
paradigm, the CAM-I model went beyond traditional definitions to inquire into
the underlying categories, or causes of, wasted capacity.
The logistics capacity model takes into account for the fact that in many
industries capacity doesn’t remain fixed in space and that productive capacity in
complex organization may have not one but a variety of productive, value creative
uses. For example, assets in a transport firm will be mobile and these assets will
exhibit variability in their load factor, or output volume. In order to track output
and productivity of assets these types of firms developed “seat miles flown” or
“revenue miles flown.” These measures focus on the output of the process and not
on the process/system capability. They are also relatively unstable over time as
changes in prices, volumes, and available seats lead to changes in the capacity
metric. Finally, they are incomplete because they do not define any limits or
boundary conditions. While they can report variances over time in terms of asset
utilization, and can be modified to integrate operational and financial metrics, the
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failure to set limits creates an ambiguous, and poorly defined, system of capacity
measurement.
The traditional CAM-I model needs to be amended to address specificity
and complexity of these very different organizations. For example, the number
and type of productive, nonproductive and idle time categories needs to be
expanded as does the number and type of cost pools in order to reflect the
differences in resource demands across various states of capacity utilization.
Our last model of capacity applied and tested in the field is the value
creation capacity model. Since capacity is defined as the value-creating ability of
an organization’s resources and systems, its definition and measurement of value
may be relevant for the development of capacity models in a variety of settings.
Capacity modelling in service settings represent a unique challenge because
of the inherent intra- and inter-variability in the “capacity” of their core assets—
people. Incapable of being bounded, the capacity of service-based systems
remains ambiguous and difficult to objectively define and measure.
The cost containment model takes one form of external data, benchmarks,
to set standards and performance expectations. These standards are more robust
than those that a budget-based, or traditional system, would provide because they
do not build from prior internal practices but rather from information about the
potential of the firm’s resources to do work. While tight boundary limits cannot be set
on this productive capability, the system does make visible a higher plateau, or
potential utilization, that can create the same pattern of decision making and
performance improvements of a more complete, stable and unbiased CCMS.
Over the past fifteen years, though, there has been a marked shift in the
definition of what “value creation” means in modern organizations (Wayland and
Cole, 1994; McNair, et al., 2000; McNair, et al., 2001). Specifically, value creation
has been transformed from an internally-defined construct of “value add” and
“non-value add” activities as seen in the eyes of management, to an externallydriven metric that builds from the customer’s perceptions of the value embedded
in a product or service. Customer preferences, or their value profiles, are
compared to the value proposition, or attributes of the product or service, to
determine the relative competitiveness of one product versus another.
The value creation approach originated in the strategy and marketing
literature, and has been primarily focused on defining value segments within the
general population and on ways to leverage the firm’s core competencies to
improve its value proposition. Recent work by McNair, et al., (2000, 2001) has
extended these models and systematically connected them with the cost structure
of the firm. The results of this research have yielded the development of a fivedimensional definition of cost within an organization: (1) Customer value-add; (2)
Business value-add, current; (3) Business value-add, future; (4) Business valueadd, administrative; and (5) Non-value add, or waste.
The relative informativeness of the two models is not as easy to evaluate.
While it is clear that they make very different aspects of the organization visible,
and that the value creation model is a more complete system in terms of the
8

number and type of information signals it provides, it is not possible to do a direct
comparison of their informativeness. This comparison would require that one
organization invest in developing and using both systems. The information in the
two systems is not redundant, but rather complementary. As such, they fail to
qualify for comparison under Feltham’s (1972) criterion.
This being said, there are other issues raised by the value creation model
that affect its informativeness. First, there are nonlinearities inherent in the value
creation approach (McNair, et al., 2001). Specifically, one dollar spent on valueadd activities will generate more than one dollar of revenue. In fact, these
“multipliers” have exceeded a 40:1 ratio for a specific value attribute in some of
the studied firms. Dollars spent on anything but value-add fail to generate current
revenues at all—they are costs but not revenue-generating. This is a new concept
in costing, one that may be initially difficult for managers to understand. Feltham
(1972) would suggest that the value of this information may be reduced because of
this uncertainty. Over time, this ambiguity should be reduced, but there is little
or no expectation that the measures developed by the value creation approach will
stabilize.
In many respects, then, the value creation-based capacity system may be
inferior in terms of the criteria of informativeness developed here. But, it is
equally possible that it may serve to change decisions in organizations to a much
greater degree than traditional capacity models because it makes visible a new
dimension of capacity—its ability to generate revenue growth. It is a strategic
model, rather than an operational or tactical model of capacity. As such, it may
ultimately have a greater impact on an organization because it has changed the
calculative space of the firm. These potential impacts remain untested and
unknown due to the recent nature of this project and the underlying literature and
research that it builds upon.
4. Research Methodology and Description
A combination of analytics and qualitative, field research methodology
(Yin, 1984; Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Glaser and Strauss, 1967) was used to test the
propositions underlying this study. Specifically, the measurement dimensions
were developed separately by at least three experts who analyzed the different
reports, baseline measures suggested, and metrics included in the various capacity
models as suggested by the existing literature on the models.3 These analytics
were enriched with observations obtained from field research conducted in three
sites covering the period spanning 1998-2003.
Table 4

3

In each case, the two researchers evaluated the systems on the stated dimensions. In addition, three outside experts on
capacity analysis, Dr. Richard Vangermeersch of the University of Rhode Island, Dr. Holly Johnston of Babson College, and
Dr. Riccardo Silvi of the University of Bologna provided assessments of one or more of the models on the defined
measurements.
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The details of each site, the study time period and number of site visits, and
the capacity cost model used by the firm are presented in Table 4. As the table
details, the site work was conducted over a period of five years. The firms in the
study were drawn from both the manufacturing and service sectors. The size of
the organizations studied varied greatly, ranging from Specialty Foods, a medium
sized service firm providing “ready-to-eat” food items within a commercial
grocery store setting to a large commercial airline that posted $3.2 billion in sales
and a workforce of 22,000.
The data collection activities focused on the comments and observed
actions of managers at the sites, as well as the actual capacity reports and metrics
used within the organization. The on-site data collection was conducted as part of
a longitudinal interpretative, grounded theory initiative (Glaser and Strauss,
1967). The interpretative paradigm recognizes that the researcher is actively
involved in creating the reality, and interpreting the results obtained, during
research within an organization. To alleviate some of the empirical concerns
embedded in grounded research, subject statements are provided to the reader to
provide a basis for assessment of the research findings or development of
alternative interpretations.
Having explored the basic theory, methods, and measurements used,
attention now turns to the analysis of the three competing models and
historical/empirical evidence of their informativeness.
5. Informativeness in Action: Analytical and Empirical Results
A capacity reporting system is a particular type of accounting system, one
that emphasizes the productivity of an asset or system against some preset
expectation, or standard, of its perceived potential to create value for the
organization and its primary stakeholders (McNair and Vangermeersch, 1998). By
the events they record, and those they ignore, these systems can be argued to
create a form of reality for the organization—to shape its calculative and physical
space.
A CCMS, though, is also a reflection of the organizations in which it is used
(Hopwood, 1983). Metrics and reports that are deemed to be of little or no value
to decision makers are unlikely to be incorporated in these systems (Feltham,
1972), regardless of their potential informativeness. These findings by prior
researchers suggest that a one dimensional analysis and inquiry into the value and
nature of capacity reporting will by nature be incomplete and inconclusive.
Reflecting these arguments, our research findings will integrate analytical,
archival, and empirical data based on three different field studies which
incorporate and build upon the three capacity reporting systems presented earlier.
5.1 Expanding the Limits: The CAM-I Model
In 1998, Windows, Inc. determined that it needed to improve its operational
measures and improve the integration of its financial measures (standard costing)
with the measures used to manage the plant floor. Ongoing decision support
10

problems were noted to be the driver of this change, as described by the financial
manager of the business development group:
We are having major problems with the launch of our new product line…and it
sure doesn’t help that it takes so long to calculate costs. The guys are changing
the design every other day, taking out features and changing methods. But,
they’re flying blind….frankly, we aren’t of much help. We aren’t even into
production and everyone is already ignoring the information out of the costing
system…The plant floor has implemented TQM, lean production, and many other
innovations that cut the time and cost to make a window. But, we haven’t
changed the costing system. Translation? There’s no way to prove that these
changes have or have not improved the bottom line. We don’t really know what
the plant is capable of, whether it is improving, or how to assess the impact of new
demand on our resources, or any other of a number of important things.. As a
result, I’m sure we’re making questionable decisions….but unless we get some
new tools, we’re not going to be able to convince anyone—even ourselves!!!.
The production of windows is both capital- and labor-intensive. The window
assembly lines have high labor content, but remain paced by one or two key
machines that perform difficult or dangerous operations.
Windows also
manufactures a wide range of basic wood components for its windows and
maintains the capability to extrude plastic coverings on its core wood components
to improve the appearance, durability, and ease of use of its products.
The inadequacies of the standard costing model within a more traditional
manufacturing setting were highlighted above. These problems expand as the
demand for decision support information grows, and as the emphasis on
identifying and eliminating waste from production increases. In other words, the
bias inherent in standard costing had made it irrelevant.
When the CAM-I model was implemented, there was an immediate
reaction from managers throughout the organization—some positive, some not so,
as the following comments by the V.P. of Operations suggest:
I knew, somehow, that things just weren’t going as planned in the door
subgroup. But I couldn’t put my finger on what it was…I mean, the
numbers in our reports were all in line, yet I couldn’t see how all of those
expensive machines were in the end buying us very much. Volumes hadn’t
changed, so it only made sense that the cost of a door must have gone up, but
every time I looked at the accounting reports, it just wasn’t there. So…I
figured I was missing something. Guess now I’d have to say I wasn’t.
I like this; by the way….I can finally compare these cost centers in some
meaningful way. The apples-to-apples stuff…that helps me counter a cost
center manager’s claim that his or her group can’t be compared to another…I
can finally hold them all to the same set of criteria, and track whether they’re
getting better. But, I don’t know how they’ll feel about it…that will be an
interesting discussion.
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The CAM-I model provided a level of comparability for a diverse set of
operations in the plant that had not been available before, a key aspect of
informativeness (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). It also provided a means for
tracking historical utilizations and to assess the effectiveness of new asset
purchases in terms of actual cost and efficiency effects. The door sub-plant, which
was a “star” prior to the capacity analysis, was now found to have failed to gain
the labor and cost improvements it had promised would result from the
acquisition of new equipment. On the other hand, the extrusion plant, which had
been noted to be a major problem, was found to have high levels of utilization and
marked improvements in overall costs and performance over the study period.
Assessing the CAM-I capacity model against the dimensions of
informativeness developed by Feltham (1972), it appears to be less biased than
standard costing or the operational perspective because it makes visible a wider
range of productive dimensions that correspond to primary causes of waste and
cost in manufacturing. Its operational capacity measures are stable over time, due
to the use of theoretical time and rates. In addition, productive capacity is
calculated using a stable measure of the consumption of capacity by one unit of
output—cycle time, or the amount of elapsed time between units coming off the
production line. Cycle time is constant for each type of product, and can easily
accommodate a variety of units with different time demands on the bottleneck.
On the cost side, its metrics have been broken into two primary categories
corresponding to how responsive the cost is to changes in utilization. This
suggests that the cost metric is also more stable than that developed under
standard costing. In terms of completeness, the number of limits has been
expanded significantly to two on the operational side, and one on the cost side.
The capacity information has been broken into a wide number of variances that
reflect the primary causes for idle and non-productive time and cost. Finally, it is
inclusive in that the cost and operational information have been integrated into
one report that makes comparison of these two primary performance dimensions
visible. It would seem that the CAM-I model is significantly more informative
than the standard cost and operational capacity models.
5.2 Boundaries in Space and Time: Logistics and Capacity
Focused on providing low cost air transportation, Easy Air had always
managed its fleet of planes with one driving goal: to maximize the time in the air.
The reason for this was simple—only when a passenger was en route was the firm
earning revenue. Easy Air utilized “seat miles flown” and “revenue miles earned”
to track their productivity. This logic, reinforced by the industry-defined measure
of capacity and the beliefs of its founder, had fueled profitable growth at Easy Air
in an industry notorious for massive losses and business failures.
In the late 1990s as the industry and the company experienced volatility in
prices, changes in volumes and available seats these traditional logistics capacity
measures didn’t provide best information in terms of costing the capacity system.

12

A senior financial manager at Easy Air succinctly described the problems
his company was facing, and the goals it was pursuing:
We sure don’t want to end up like the rest of our competitors, losing money
by the bucket and not knowing how to make things better. No matter how
good things get….we simply have to manage the company in good times so
we can survive the bad times. And there have been some awfully bad times
lately for the airline industry. We just don’t use them as an excuse…they
are a challenge, a reason to keep looking for ways to get a little bit better at
what we do.
That’s why we’re so hooked into this capacity issue…heck, we fly our assets
all over the place and we only make money when people are on them and
we’re getting them where they want to go on time with no hiccups along the
way. But right now we’re measuring it just like everyone else. It doesn’t
feel right, but to date we just haven’t found a better way. I worry,
though…if we’re using the same measures, won’t we risk getting the same
results? How do we know if we’re getting better or simply growing
volume? Where could we improve and what would it mean? These are the
questions I get asked to look at…and I don’t have a good answer right
now….
The Easy Air site provided an excellent opportunity to look at the
informativeness of a capacity reporting system that was unbounded with one that
was more completely defined. The challenge was to identify the number and type
of limits necessary to stabilize the cost and capacity metrics the system would
develop.
In examining capacity from the perspective of its boundaries or maximum
ability to create value, it became clear to the project team that capacity for an
airline would need to be bound in time, in “space” (e.g., load factor), and the
degree of effective utilization of this “time and space” form of capacity. Three
specific limits were required to frame the capacity of the system. None of these
limits, though, emphasized the distance flown, which had been the prior
definition of capacity. Distance was not a dimension of value creation that was
easily bounded—many factors influenced how many miles were flown on any one
day by any one plane, creating ambiguity in the resulting metric. Time and
available seats per plane (or “tail” in airline terms), on the other hand, could be
tightly defined. No matter what was done with a plane, it was only available for
8,760 hours a year and could only convey a specific number of passengers at any
time.
As the extensive research project on measuring capacity at Easy Air
evolved, it became clear that there was one other boundary or condition that
would need to be considered to effectively capture not only the potential capacity
of an airplane but also how and why variations in utilization occurred. While
there were air control and weather issues affecting the plane while en route, the
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major issues it struggled with emerged when the plane was on the ground—the
interaction of the plane with ground operations placed unique limits on the
plane’s productive capacity. To the extent that ground operations, such as loading
and unloading baggage and boarding passengers, was done inefficiently, planebased capacity would be sacrificed.
Figure 1
The capacity model that was derived from this analysis is presented in
Figure 1. As can be seen, the number and type of productive, nonproductive and
idle time categories have expanded significantly, reflecting the addition of
additional limits to the CAM-I model. Similarly, the number and type of cost
pools was greatly expanded to reflect the differences in resource demands across
various states of capacity utilization. This expansion in cost pools included the
development of ground operation costs (capacity and activity-based) for those
times when the plane was at a gate or being serviced. Failures, such as problems
with bag handling, lost luggage, or stranded passengers, were also analyzed for
their impact on plane capacity and the total costs incurred by Easy Air during its
normal operations.
The new capacity system reflected a marked improvement in the
informativeness. Specifically, it made a greater number of forms of utilization
visible, and focused on a clearly defined and bounded aspect of capacity, making
it less biased than the prior model used by the firm. Having established these
limits tightly, the resulting measurements became quite stable over time and
volume changes—these changes were explained, not hidden in a moving average
or measure of capacity. The system was also much more complete on every
dimension of this construct—number of limits, number of variances supported,
and inclusiveness/number of cost pools.
Easy Air’s transition from one system of capacity reporting to a second
provides the clearest illustration of Feltham’s (1972) arguments. Since it can be
assumed that the other information signals received by management were
unchanged by the change in capacity reports, the information value embedded in
these two systems can be compared and evaluated. The issue that remains,
though, is whether this change in information content leads to changes in
decisions and behavior—does what the CCMS makes visible influence decision
makers?
Figure 2
Several events subsequent to the roll-out of the revised CCMS suggest that
changes are beginning to occur. The most marked of these changes is illustrated
in Figure 2. When the total capacity of the company was summarized across a
normal operating day, the radical ramp up in flights and plane utilization that
began at 9 am East coast time (EST) and ended at 7 pm on the West cost (PT)
became quite obvious. What was clear in talking with Easy Air managers was that
they had not been aware of this phenomenon—it was not visible or apparent in
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their traditional capacity system because this system did not track utilization in
terms of time.
Once the issue of shoulder time was understood, management turned its
attention to identifying the incremental profit of adding flights to the beginning
and end of the day—to increasing its level of productive capacity utilization. The
change in the CCMS had had the required effect to qualify as a change in its
information value—it had changed management’s understanding of the problem
as well as the decisions being made within the firm.
5.3 Revisiting Capacity in Service Settings: The Role of Customer Value Creation
Specialty Foods is a large specialty food producer whose employees
perform a variety of activities.4 Specialty Foods provides one illustration of how
capacity cost systems may evolve (see Figure 3) to incorporate value creating
capability of the systems. Variances are developed for each of the five primary
states of capacity. The model, reflecting the basic report structure developed by
CAM-I (Klammer, 1996), emphasizes total value created across the range of
activities performed by Specialty Foods’ employees. As suggested earlier these
activities need to be sorted in non-value add, business value-add-administrative,
business value-add-future and current and customer value add. While the
capacity reporting grid has not been fully populated for this example, the firm is
currently collecting the information required to complete it. Data collection
process is resulting in some interesting conversations at Specialty Foods as
employees think of connections between time spent and the ability of activities
performed to impact revenue generation.
Figure 3
How does the informativeness of this system compare to that of the
traditional cost containment model? Both incorporate externally-defined limits to
offset some of the inherent measurement problems in service settings. Both are
relatively unbounded, in that the maximum amount of value the organization
could create cannot be defined. Both incorporate both operational and financial
metrics and present a reasonable number of variances to explain variability in
performance.
The primary difference between the two models lies in their definition of
capacity. The cost containment model attempts to use a more traditional measure
of capacity utilization—the productivity of the firm’s assets. It is a cost-centered
and cost improvement-driven approach. The value creation approach, on the
other hand, emphasizes the revenue generating capabilities of the firm’s resources.
Productive time becomes tightly defined as the time and costs incurred that a
customer directly benefits from. In this respect, the value creation model more

4

As with all of the reports and analysis presented in this paper, the actual numbers, results, and features of Specialty Foods
has been disguised. The transformations used retained the accuracy of the underlying relationships, but were scaled to
hide the true identify of the firm.
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closely proxies the concept of cycle time and productive cost in more well defined
machine-paced settings.
6. Summary and Opportunities for Future Research
The purpose of this paper was to fill the gap between defining and
measuring the productive limits of a machine or system, and the impact of
various assumptions about the productive potential and the nature and
informativeness of the CCMS. This was done by testing the proposition that the
way in which capacity is measured and reported seems to affect the management
decision-making as well as the economic performance of the firm. To confirm this,
three advanced CCMS models were tested in different organizational settings.
These three systems, their basic description, and the nature of the limits they place
on resource capacity are summarized in Table 5.
Table 5
Specifically, this research suggests that the limits used in establishing the
capacity cost management system restricts the amount and nature of the
information the system is capable of providing to management. Maximizing the
value created within an organization starts with understanding the nature and
capability of all the company’s resources. The outcome is the identification of
capacity systems specifically suited for particular types of operations, both
manufacturing and service. Such frameworks would allow organisations in
developing economies, to make visible, the drivers of waste and productivity and
to identify the primary assumptions and implications of various capacity limits. In
particular when assessing the CAM-I capacity model against the dimensions of
informativeness developed by Feltham (1972), it appears to be less biased than
standard costing or the operational perspective because it makes visible a wider
range of productive dimensions that correspond to primary causes of waste and
cost in manufacturing.
With the logistics model, the CCMS had the required effect of qualifying as
a change in its information value—it had changed management’s understanding
of the problem, as well as the decisions being made within the firm. With respect
to the value creation model it may be inferior in terms of the criteria of
informativeness developed here. But, it is equally possible that it may serve to
change decisions in organizations to a much greater degree than traditional
capacity models, because it makes visible a new dimension of capacity—its ability
to generate revenue growth. It is a strategic model, rather than an operational or
tactical model of capacity.
Opportunities for future work in the area of CCMS exist in further
exploration of visibility of limits on the capacity measures and systems. There is a
need for more data from different organizational contexts and decisions for which
capacity systems are needed. While the data from three field study suggests the
benefits of better visibility of CCMS for decision-making, more work is needed to
better understand how managers interpreted the information from different
16

capacity systems and what alternative courses of action might be considered with
alternative capacity cost information and knowledge. More work needs to be done
to identify the modeling of connecting capacity cost systems) to incorporate value
creating capability of the systems. This paper contributes to the existing literature
on capacity cost and visibility (Brierley et al., 2001). Overall the authors believe
that these models and their adoption to specific organizational types, will allow
firms which make the best use of their resources, to outperform their competitors
and enable specific investigations which make capacity a visible, and hence an
actionable, construct.
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Table 1
Basic Capacity Measurements and Definitions
Capacity
Measure
Definition

Theoretical

Practical

The maximum amount of capability of a machine
or process. In practice this is often described as
“24-7, The best you can be.”

Theoretical capacity reduced for “unavoidable”
downtime. In practice, engineering estimates
normally reduce theoretical by 30% as a first
pass at establishing practical capacity limits.

Example
There is a maximum of 8,760
available hours in a year. If a
machine can produce, at best,
one unit every 10 minutes, its
theoretical capacity would be
52,560 units of output.
There are still 8,760 hours in a
year, but now we only expect
to make a unit every 14.3
minutes (10/.7). The practical
capacity would be 36,792 units
of output (8760 times 60/14.3).
Let’s now assume our
machine is only run one shift
per day. Its normal capacity
would be 8,736 units (2080
hrs. times 60/14.3), or only
16.7% of the original capability
of the asset.

Normal

Normal capacity is the average utilization of an
asset over a 3 to 5 year period. Note that
attention has been turned away from the
capability of the machine or process to the way
in which that asset is utilized.

Budget

The coming years expected demand for output
from a machine or process. Once again, the
planned utilization, not capability, of the asset
serves as the basis for this definition.

The firm expects to produce
9,000 units in the coming year
on this machine.

Actual

The actual production achieved with the asset
for a given period.

The firm was able to produce
9,500 units during the year.

Table 2 Comparative Capacity Utilization Metrics
Capacity Baseline

Actual
Utilization

Utilization Metric
(Actual over Baseline)

Budgeted capacity (9,000
units)

9,500 units

9,500 or 105.6% Utilization
9,000

Variance to Budget

Normal capacity (8,736
units)

9,500 units

9,500 or 108.7% Utilization
8,736

Variance to Normal

Practical capacity
(36,792 units)

9,500 units

9,500 or 25.8% Utilization
36,792

Variance to Practical

Theoretical capacity
(56,250 units)

9,500 units

9,500 or 18.1% Utilization
56,250

Variance to Theoretical
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Name of Metric

Table 3
Dimension

Dimensions of Measurements Used
Measurements

Definition

Emphasis

What dimension of system
capacity is measured?

Degree of bias

The number of productive and
nonproductive capacity uses
that are identified, tracked and
reported by the system.

Visibility

Stability

Consistency of signal over
time

The number/size of the
capacity baseline measure
from one period to the next.

Consistency of signal over
various levels of utilization

The degree of change in cost
estimates as productive
volumes change.

Scope
Completeness

Number of limits

Variability

Number of variances

Inclusiveness

Table 4

Number of cost pools and/or
estimates incorporated

Description of Field Research Site Characteristics
Windows Inc

Easy Air

Specialty Foods

Period of study

1998-2000

2000-2003

2003

Total site visits

30

18

12

Residential
windows and doors

Passenger air
travel

“Ready-to-eat”
specialty foods

Estimated
revenues

$1.5 billion

$4.5 billion

$ 10 million

Number of
employees

4,500

22,000

200

Type of CCMS
used

CAM-I

Logistics

Value-Creation

Issue

Primary business
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Figure 1
Capacity Report
Year Ending: 12/31/2000
(in millions of dollars)

Industry Specific
Off Limits
Marketable

Category
Airport/Flying Restrictions
Unscheduled--Idle in Hangar

Hours

% of total
hrs

Cost
Code

Cost
Rate

Total Dollars

% of total
$'s

Total Idle Capacity
Repositioning Aircraft
Idle--Scheduling Gap

Standby

Crew Shortages--Scheduling Problems

Service Quality Issues--Delays

Repositioning aircraft--schedule prob.

Baggage handling delays
Wait for connecting flights
Unplanned Maintenance
Scheduled Maintenance
Allowable gate/turn time
Excess gate/turn time
Airplane servicing
Airborne Time
Taxi/Take-Off
Landing/Taxi In
Weather delays/rerouting
Air traffic delays--in flight
Passenger emergencies
Airport delays--on ground
Personnel training
Developmental projects

Maintenance
Set-ups

Load Factor Loss (Yield)

Uncontrollable Delays

Non-Work Related
Total Non-Productive
Airborne Time
Taxi/Take Off
Landing/Taxi-in
Total Productive
Total Capacity Hours + Costs

Figure 2

“Shoulder Time” at Easy Air

Total Planes
Available

Shoulder
Time

Total
Planes in
Use

7 am 9 am
EST EST

Operating Day

5 am EST

7 pm
PT

9 pm
PT
12 pm PT
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Figure 3 A Sample Value Creation Capacity Report
Capacity Report
Specialty Foods

Summary Category
Off Limits
Idle Capacity
Marketable

Category
Management Policy (Holidays)
Idle but Usable

Total Idle Capacity
Non-Value Add

Business Value-Add--Administrative
Business Value-Add--Future

Business Value-Add--Current

2,928.00
Paid Breaks
Excess time in prep
Scrap
Meetings
Ordering
Inventory
Training
Create new recipes/Products
Rotate stock
Prep batch
Clean-up from batch
Fill cases

Total Business Value-Add and Non-Value Add

11,284.50

290.00
377.50
11,952.00

Food Quality
Food Healthiness
Service Quality
Presentation/Cleanliness

Customer Value Add

Hours
85.00
2,843.00

2,640.00

Total Customer Value Add

2,640.00

Total Capacity Hours + Costs

17,520.00
Number of employees

2
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% of total
hrs
0.5%
16.2%

$
$

Rate
5.25
5.25

Total Dollars
$
446
$
14,926

% of total Cost/ Good
$'s
unit
0.15% $
0.031
4.94% $
1.051

16.7%
0.0%
64.4%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
1.7%
2.2%
0.0%

$

5.25

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

19.65
19.65
19.65
19.65
19.65
19.65
19.65
19.65
19.65
19.65
19.65
19.65

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

15,372
221,740
5,699
7,418
-

5.09%
0.00%
73.40%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
1.89%
2.46%
0.00%

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

1.083
15.616
0.401
0.522
-

68.2%
15.1%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

$
$
$
$
$

19.65
19.65
19.65
19.65
19.65

$
$
$
$
$

234,857
51,876
-

77.74%
17.17%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

$
$
$
$
$

16.539
3.653
-

15.1%

$ 19.65

$

51,876

17.17% $

3.653

$

302,105

100.00% $

21.275

100.0%

Table 5

Capacity Model

A Range of CCMS Models

Description
Shifts attention to the “state of
preparedness” (Church, 1934) of
the underlying asset or system.

CAM-I Model
(Klammer, 1996)

Classifies capacity utilization in
terms of various categories of
productive, nonproductive, and
idle time.

Examines shifts in definition of
capacity as the asset is allowed to
move within space.

Logistics Model
(McNair, et al., 2003)

Interdependence between assets
or systems is examined as the
core asset moves within space.
Activity costs used to fully capture
the economic implications of
different forms of variation and
interaction between systems.

Value Creation Approach
(McNair, et al., 2000; 2003)

Shifts focus of definition of
productive utilization from an
internal perspective (defined on
units produced or activities
performed) to an external
perspective (customer-defined
value creation).
Underlying definitions of utilization
and value become increasingly
perceptual.
Emphasis shifts from one asset or
system to the organization’s
capability to create value.

Comments
Theoretical capacity baseline is
adopted. Two primary limits
established within system:
time and effectiveness of
utilization.
Economic impact of capacity
utilization integrated into model
through use of committed and
managed capacity costs.

Theoretical capacity baselines
developed on four dimensions:
Time, space or volume of the
core asset, effectiveness of
core asset utilization, and
interaction of core asset with
other primary systems or
assets.
Cost model expanded to
include multiple states of
preparedness, utilization, and
interaction with other systems.

Limits defined now on both
physical features (time, space,
effectiveness of core asset
utilization and potential
interactions) as well as the
value-creating ability of the
productive effort (value-add,
business value-add, and
nonvalue-add).
Limits and costs established in
terms of perceptual features,
such as the value creating
capability of a resource, activity
or system are unbounded,
nonlinear, and unstable.
Cost model expanded to
include multiple dimensions of
productive and nonproductive
capacity across the
organization.
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